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CALCULATING NUCLEAR ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES 
FROM EMPIRICAL FREQUENCIES
Minh Ha-Duong et Venance Journé1
2014-04-10
Summary
Since there is no authoritative, comprehensive and public historical record of 
nuclear  power  plant  accidents,  we  reconstructed  a nuclear  accident  dataset 
from peer-reviewed  and other  literature.  We found  that,  in  a  sample  of  five 
random years, the worldwide historical frequency of a nuclear major accident, 
defined as an INES level 7 event, is 14%. This value is 67 % to have at least 
one nuclear accident rated at level ≥ 4 on the INES scale. These numbers are 
subject  to uncertainties  because the fuzziness  of  the  definition  of  a nuclear  
accident.
Résumé
En  l'absence  d'une  liste  d'accidents  nucléaires  de  référence,  exhaustive  et 
publique, nous avons reconstruit l'historique des accidents nucléaires dans les 
centrales électriques à partir de la littérature scientifique et de diverses sources 
publiques. Dans un échantillon de cinq années aléatoires, la probabilité d'avoir 
dans le monde un accident nucléaire majeur (niveau INES 7) est de 14%. Celle 
d'avoir  au  moins  un accident  nucléaire  (niveau  INES ≥ 4)  est  de  67%.  Ces 
chiffres sont entachés d'incertitude à cause du caractère flou dans la définition 
d'un accident nucléaire.
1 Introduction
The major accident that occurred in Fukushima on 11 March 2011 led to a 
renewed scientific interest in assessing nuclear risks. In the press, there has 
been a number of declarations such as Laponche et al. (2011) who claimed that 
the probability of a serious nuclear accident in the next thirty years was a 
“statistical certainty" for the European Union. Moreover countries such as Austria, 
China, Finland, France, Germany, India and Italy have responded with the 
adoption of very diverse nuclear safety and energy policies. Considering the 
policy importance of this issue, we recompute these estimates constructing our 
own data set and using a different method.
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Risk has two dimensions: the probability of an accident and the magnitude of its 
consequences. This paper deals with the first dimension of risk, the probability. 
The causes that might result in a serious nuclear accident are manifold and they 
include but are not limited to: design errors, construction problems, material or 
hardware deficiencies, internal events such as pipe break or fire, external events 
such as a plane crash or natural hazards (earthquake, floods), and mostly human 
causes, such as errors in manipulation, insufficient safety information, bad 
knowledge of instructions. In many cases, the accidents are due to a combination 
of several factors.
Despite the complexity of causes, nuclear engineers and scientists have tried to 
estimate the probability of a nuclear accident. One commonly used method is the 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) method that computes, in a bottom-up 
combination, the probability of an accident as the product of the probabilities of 
all known different possible failures. This method allows to assess risks and 
identify potentials to improve safety. However,  However, the PRA analysis are 
bound to be subject to uncertainties since they cannot be totally exhaustive and 
there are uncertainties in knowledge. This usually results in a small probability.
Table 1 shows how the predictions for the PRA methodology compare to the 
historical record. In the first column, are indicated given nuclear accident 
probabilities per reactor per year, denoted ε. The numerical objective defined for 
core damage frequency, as evaluated from PRA studies, range from 10-4 to 10-6 
for regulators in different countries (NEA-OECD, 2012). The second column 
shows at the expected number of accidents in the whole history of the nuclear 
industry for each value of ε. As of end of 2012, 437 reactors were in operation 
worldwide, and the cumulative nuclear reactor-years of operation worldwide and 
including all technologies adds up to 15,080 (European Nuclear Society, 2013). 
These values should correspond to core damage accidents of 0,15 to 1,5 for 
15,080 reactor-years (15,080 times ε). This number is small compared to the real 
number of accidents.
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Accident probability 
per reactor per year
Expected number of 
accidents since 1950
Probability of at least 
one accident in 5 years
Probability of at least one 
accident in 30 years
ε 15080 * ε 1 - (1-ε) ^ (437*5) 1 - (1-ε) ^ (437*30)
10^-6 0.015 0,22% 1,30 %
10^-5 0.15 2,16 % 12,29 %
10^-4 1.5 19,63 % 73,05 %
10^-3 15 88,76 % 99,9998 % 
Table 1 : Four viewpoints on accidents probability.
The probability of an accident per reactor per year (first column) remains  
the same along each line. The probability of seeing an accident depends  
on how many reactors are observed during how many years.
The third and fourth columns indicate the probabilities of having an accident in 
five and 30 years for 437 reactors, assuming that the reactor-year accident 
probability is ε. The number of 437 reactors corresponds approximately to the 
number of nuclear reactors operating in the world today.
Thus given the complexity of the overall system, and the discrepancy between 
the values given by PRA analyzes and the number of accidents, a holistic 
approach such as the use of historical frequencies is used in this study. We 
assess the frequency of a nuclear accident and of a major accident from past 
experience.
In section 2, the basis on which nuclear accidents have been selected to 
construct the data set is defined and the way in which the discrete INES scale 
does not take into account the complexities of a reality which is “fuzzy” is 
explained. Section 3 contains a review of some literature on nuclear accident 
risks with emphasis on probability estimates and nuclear accident inventories. In 
section 4, the construction of the data set is described. The method and results 
are presented in section 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 INES scale and nuclear accidents
The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) is a worldwide 
tool for communicating to the public the safety significance of nuclear and 
radiological events (IAEA, 2009). It was developed by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) : the IAEA statutes (article II – Objectives) states that 
“The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic  
energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so 
far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its  
supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military  
purpose” (IAEA, 2012) - and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency – whose mission 
is "To assist its member countries in maintaining and further developing, through 
international co-operation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required 
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for a safe, environmentally friendly and economical use of nuclear energy for  
peaceful purposes. To provide authoritative assessments and to forge common 
understandings on key issues as input to government decisions on nuclear 
energy policy and to broader OECD policy analyzes in areas such as energy and 
sustainable development."(NEA, 2013)
Events are classified on the scale with 7levels. For communicating to the public, 
distinct designations have been attributed to each level, from anomaly (level 1) to 
major accident (level 7): « the severity of an event could increase by about an 
order of magnitude for each increase in level on the scale » (IAEA, 2009).
According to the IAEA's vocabulary, any event whose severity is rated at INES 
level ≥ 4 on the INES scale is an accident. Below level 4, the event is called 
incident. As mentioned above and illustrated on Table 2, there are many types of 
accidents. The potential consequences of an accident range from those limited to 
the core, to those contained inside the pressure vessel, to the release of 
radioactivity in the environment and those affecting the population. Because of 
this diversity, there are several criteria to assess the severity of an accident and 
the INES defines a level 4 event by any of the following characteristics:
1. At least one death from radiation.
2. Minor environmental release of radioactive material unlikely to result in 
implementation of planned countermeasure other than local food controls.
3. Fuel melt or damage to fuel resulting in more than 0.1 % release of core 
inventory.
4. Release of significant quantities of radioactive material within an 
installation with a high probability of significant public exposure.
The IAEA criteria provides the only agreed definition of a nuclear accident. 
However, the construction of an historical nuclear accident data set on the basis 
of the INES rating is an uncertain process for the following reasons:
• Back-rating: The INES scale was developed only in 1990. Many previous 
events are not officially rated on the scale. Unofficial ratings may be found 
in the literature that may not be adequately justified.
• Fuzziness: The INES scale is a communication instrument2, not a safety 
evaluation tool. The INES manual provides guidance for reporting the 
events using only a single number, but the proper definition of an accident 
is complex. The fuzziness of the categorization using the INES level is 
apparent from the above four criteria : the terms “minor", "likely", 
"significant" are used. It is also the case for higher levels : one of the 
characteristics of rating is the quantity of radioactivity released and the 
2The first lines of the INES reference User's Manual (2008 edition )  state “The need for easily communicating 
the significance of any event ...” (Foreword, page v.) and “The International Nuclear and Radiological Event 
Scale is used for promptly and consistently communicating to the public the safety significance of events 
associated with sources of radiation.” (section 1.1)
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/INES2009_web.pdf)
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boundaries between levels from 4 to 7 are set approximately to 500, 5000 
and 50 000 tera-becquerels (IAEA, 2009, p. 17). Moreover, the 
quantitative variables used to rate accidents, such as the released 
radioactivity, cannot be always precisely estimated either.
• Heterogeneity: The difficulty to characterize precisely an accident and its 
consequences, and therefore the ensuing fuzziness of the INES scale, 
makes the historical and geographical uniformity of assessment difficult to 
ensure, unlike the Richter earthquake magnitude scale for example. This 
difficulty could be partially alleviated if there were a world entity in charge 
of the consistent interpretation and rating of an accident. But rating is the 
responsibility of the power plant owner, or of the regulation entity in 
certain countries such as France, which is therefore the unique source of 
primary information. This can lead to important differences in reporting.
• Secrecy: To be notable, an event must have caused well-attested and 
substantial radioactivity release and contamination. For example, an 
accident that occurred in September 1957 in Soviet Union has been 
acknowledged only decades after  :the  waste storage explosion at 
Mayak, a plutonium production reactor for nuclear weapons and nuclear 
fuel reprocessing plant, near Kyshtym. This accident would have been 
rated at level 6 on the INES scale, 15,000 square kilometers were 
contaminated. It was made public to the outside world by Soviet dissident 
Zhores Medvedev in 1976 (Medvedev, 1976). The fact that serious events 
are not made public may also occur in the West: on 17 December 1987, 
eighteen months after the Chernobyl major accident, a serious incident 
occurred in the Biblis power station in West Germany. It was known 
internationally nine months later in an expert meeting in Vienna and made 
public one year later in an article published by Nucleonics Week, and 
rated at level 1 on the INES scale (Hibbs, et al, 1988). Therefore this 
serious incident in a purely civilian nuclear power plant was not known to 
the IAEA when it occurred. These examples underline the fact that some 
events, which could involve important radiation contamination or potential 
for much more serious consequences, can be kept secret from the public.
• Dual and multiple uses: Some accidents cannot be attributed only to 
power production. This is the case for those occurring in nuclear reactors 
producing jointly isotopes and electric power. Also, research and 
commercial uses cannot be distinguished in the case of large-scale 
reactor prototypes.
• Simultaneity: Power plants usually have two or more power reactor units. 
In our study, several simultaneous accidents at one plant are counted as 
a single one, such as  However, in the case of the Fukushima Daichi 
major accident, results will be provided counting it as one accident as well 
as three accidents. 
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3 Previous studies on nuclear accident frequencies
There have been many studies on various aspects of nuclear accident 
frequencies and their scope is restricted to specific types or to a limited number 
of accidents. Assessments range from the assertion that « nuclear power plants 
are very robust » (World Nuclear Association, 2012) to the conclusion that 
« nuclear power comes with the inevitability of catastrophic accidents » (Ramana, 
2011).
As stated above, Laponche and Dessus (2011) argued that nuclear accidents 
were statistically certain. They wrote that: “On the basis of the major accidents 
having occurred these last thirty years, the occurrence probability of a major 
accident would therefore be about 50% for France and more than 100% for 
European Union". Giving more details on the calculations, Ghys (2011) estimated 
this later probability to be about 72 %, based the same data (4 catastrophic core 
failures - 1 in Chernobyl, 3 in Fukushima - for 14 000 reactor-years).
Stratton (1967) published the first seminal review of criticality accidents. This 
work is about a subset of nuclear accidents, and does not look at commercial 
nuclear power plants. It was first revised in 1989 and updated again by 
McLaughlin et al (2000). The 2000 edition contains 60 accidents, 19 of which are 
new to it.
Lochbaum (2000), for the Union of Concerned Scientists, studied the risk 
assessment reports published by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and 
concluded that the probability assessments were biased towards lower values by 
the use of many unrealistic assumptions regarding plant design, construction and 
operation, a very limited number of human errors.
Kastchiev et al. (2007) have studied the safety records of nuclear power plants to 
assess risks and possible consequences of nuclear accidents. Based on the 
analysis of sixteen events, they concluded that “many nuclear safety related 
events [...] go either entirely unnoticed by the broader public or remain 
significantly under-evaluated when it comes to their potential risk”.
T. Cochran (2011) gave a testimony where he stated that the historical frequency 
of core melt accident is about 1 in 1400 reactor-years which is rather far from the 
probability risk assessment estimate of 2 × 10-5 to 1 × 10-4 events/reactor-year 
for accidents (INES level ≥ 4) published in 1986 by the US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. Cochran's paper lists 12 nuclear power reactors (including Sodium 
Reactor Experiment) that have experienced fuel-damage or partial core-melt 
accidents. 
Smythe (2011) proposed a new scale for the magnitude of nuclear accidents. He 
describes a list of 33 events in which he counts 4 events as catastrophic, leading 
him to conclude that “A magnitude 7 or greater accident is to be expected every 
12–15 years."
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Escobar Ranger and Lévêque (2013) have used a statistical - Poisson - model 
approach and performed a methodological study for the same problem, based on 
continuous time models and reliability theory. They found that the Fukushima 
major accident leads to a re-evaluation of previous risks assessments. 
4 Construction of the dataset
The Aircraft Crashes Record Office compiles all aircraft accidents in the civilian 
aviation sector and makes complete and detailed statistics available to the public 
(ACRO, 2014). On the contrary, int he civilian nuclear energy sector, there is no 
world data set of nuclear accidents, and there is no way to have harmonized 
information on such events. The IAEA hosts a website NEWS “The Information 
Channel on Nuclear and radiological Events” which displays short reports of 
accidents as they are deposited on the website, but there is no website or 
directory of accidents including incident and accident statistics with detailed 
information on specific events. Moreover, in its disclaimer, it declares : “The IAEA 
makes no warranties, either express or implied, concerning the accuracy, 
completeness, reliability, or suitability of the information.” (IAEA, 2014) Moreover, 
the IAEA is not legally bound to reply to all queries for information (Kastchier 
2007, note page 5).
Many online sources, including the IAEA, have been consulted for this study, but 
with no assurance that any of them is complete. For instance, the IAEA NEWS 
(2012) web page states that « event reports are filed and updated by participating 
countries which remain responsible for all related content » and does not contain 
an archive which is publicly available. The available information  include: event 
description, INES rating, related technical information and press releases. We 
also  consulted accident lists published online by Wikipedia (2012) and other 
sources, other databases provided by non governmental organizations, or 
independent researchers, some of them containing a lot of information such as 
Johnston's (2011) archives and Climatesceptics.org (2012).
In building this sample, the goal was to find and record all events rated at INES 
level ≥ 3 which occurred at a licensed and commercially operational power plant 
since 1951, the start of nuclear energy for civilian purposes. Given the lack of 
standardized and complete world data set, the reconstructed data set suffers 
from the deficiencies discussed in Section 2 above. There is uncertainty on the 
number of events and in their rating, since the INES levels are not precise 
enough, including in terms on released radioactivity, and thus the frontier 
between accident and incidents is fuzzy.
The present study is only based on accidents with an INES level ≥ 4. 3
3Since the limits between INES level are fuzzy, accidents rated at level = 3 were also looked for in the research 
to build the dataset. This will be used, in a later study, to allow more specific tests regarding the influence on the 
results of this study stemming from a fuzzy frontier between different INES levels.
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Examples of accidents related to nuclear power 
production
Examples of nuclear accidents not related to 
electricity production, not considered in this 
paper
Uranium mine. Radioactive waste spill. Church Rock, 
USA, 1979 (no immediate direct fatality)
Weapons. Criticality accident with Pu metal assembly. 
Los Alamos, USA, 1946 (1 fatality)
Fuel facility. Criticality accident with Uranium solution. 
Tokaimura, Japan, 1999 (2 fatalities)
Naval propulsion. K27 submarine reactor accident. 
Russia, 1968 (9 fatalities)
Reprocessing facility. Chemical explosion following 
tank cooling system failure. Kychtym, Russia, 1957 
(300 × 50km area contaminated)
Attack. Five RPG-7 rockets fired on nuclear plant 
construction site. Creys-Malville, France, 1982 (minor 
damage)
Power reactor. Partial core melt. Saint Laurent des 
Eaux, France, 1969. (no immediate direct fatality)
Industrial. Lost gamma radiography source. 
Conceptión, Chile, 2005 (3 workers injured)
Medical. Radiotherapy overexposure. Zaragoza, 
Spain, 1990 (11 fatalities)
Table 2 : Types of nuclear accidents. This paper only considers those  
involving electricity production (left column).
Several accident types are listed in Table 2. Only events of the categories 
described in the left column pertaining to the production of nuclear electricity are 
retained in the dataset. The right column shows that many other types of 
radiological accidents are not taken into account in the present study : military 
activities as well as those such as medical activities or industrial activities which 
cannot lead to major accidents were ignored.
For events having occurred before 1991, when the INES scale became operative, 
accident descriptions were used to assess a level equivalent to the INES level. 
We assembled a data set of all events with an INES level ≥ 3 in the power sector. 
It contains 68 records summarized in Table 3 (see annex). Excluding level 3 
events, Table 4a retains all events with an INES level ≥ 4 in all types of nuclear 
facilities. Excluding events in test facilities or fuel facilities, Table 4b lists the 13 
accidents which occurred in nuclear power plants. Those are the only ones kept 
for this study.
Figure 1 shows the time distribution of events by INES level and shows a 
decrease in the number of accidents, but the two4 major accidents occur in the 
later decades. Figure 2 shows the number of nuclear reactors in operation as a 
function of time : the number of reactors is increasing steadily until the mid 80s, 
and then remains at a roughly constant level until 2012. The comparison of those 
two figures shows that the bulk of accidents occurred before 1986 and that few 
accidents occurred when the number of reactors was at its maximum. The 
absolute number of accidents decreases, but the damage on environment does 
not decrease.
4Or four major accidents if one considers that 3 major accidents occurred in Fukushima Daichi. 
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5 Method
An accident being defined as an event with an INES level ≥ 4, the empirical 
frequency of the number of accidents over T years is computed using the method 
described below. Over the 61 years from 1951 to 2011, there was 49 years with 
no accident, 11 with one accident and one year with two accidents. The number 
of accidents in one year is modeled as a random variable denoted X. This 
variable takes the value 0, 1, 2 with a probability respectively of 49/61, 11/61 and 
1/61.
To consider the number of accidents in T years, each year is independently 
drawn with re-sampling. This number is described by the random variable Y 
defined as the sum of T realizations of X. 
The probability law of Y can be computed from the probability law of X. This is a 
classical problem of probability. The combinatorial counting required here is 
mathematically the same as the counting involved in the expansion of polynomial. 
This leads to use the so-called moment-generating function of a discrete variable 
X, defined by gX (z) = ∑
k
 p(X=k) zk.
gX (z) = 49/61 + 11/61 z + 1/61 z² 
The moment-generating function of Y can be obtained from the moment-
generating function of X by polynomial expansion:
gY (z) = gX(z)T
The coefficients of gY(z) directly give the probability distribution of Y.
The results are shown in the Table 5a for T = 5, and in Table 5b for T = 30. 
Regarding the number of major accidents, where there has been 59 years with 
none, and 2 years with one, the same method has been used with the generating 
function 59/61 + 2/61 z. The results are shown on the second lines on Table 5a 
and table 5b .
Numerical results were verified with a different statistical method: the bootstrap 
method. This method relies on iterated computer simulations. It involves drawing 
five years randomly in {1951, ..., 2011} and counting the accidents in these years. 
This is then repeated for 100,000 times to look at the statistical distribution of 
results. Since the repetition number is large enough, the statistical distribution of 
results is a satisfying approximation of the law of Y. The sample is represented in 
Figure 1 since it contains the number of accidents per year.
The results are shown in the Table 6a for T = 5, and in Table 6b for T = 30.
6 Results
Calculations were performed for a five-year time-span, which correspond to a 
typical decision-making time horizon, and for the same 30-year time-span, as 
used by Laponche, Dessus and Ghys. 
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The results presented in Table 5a show that for a sample of five random years, 
assuming that probability distribution of accidents is constant over the considered 
time span, the probability of having one year with one nuclear major accident 
(INES level = 7) is 14.3 %, and the probability of having two major accidents is 
1.0 %. The probability of having at least one nuclear accident (INES level ≥4) in 
the same five random year sample is 66.6 %.
The results in Table 5b show that for a sample of thirty random years the 
probability of drawing at least one year with a major accident is 63.2 %, and the 
probability for two or more major accidents is 25.8 %. These results are in 
agreement with the previously published studies.
Table 6a and Table 6b show the analogous results using the bootstrap method: 
the absolute differences with the numbers shown Tables 5 and 6 are always less 
than 0,2%. This validates the numerical computations of this study since the 
generating functions method is exact, while the bootstrap method is approximate.
Systematic errors due to the inherent ambiguities and uncertainties in the 
construction of the data set as discussed in Section 2 have been estimated. For 
example, since the study is limited to operational nuclear power plants, it does 
not take into account the Kychtym accident nor the Tokai-Mura criticality 
accident. It could be argued that one should count all accidents related to the 
nuclear power industry, even those that occurred in reprocessing installations. As 
a sensitivity analysis study, probabilities were computed including the Kyshtym 
event to the 13 accidents dataset. The frequency of five-year samples with no 
accidents drops from 33.4 % to 30.2 %.
The main assumption underlying the computation of accident frequencies from 
past data is that the accident probability distribution in past years is constant. 
Since our sample has low statistics, our discussion on auto-correlation and trends 
could be only qualitative (see Hofert 2011, section 3.1 for a quantitative analysis 
of these questions). Auto-correlation could occur for several reasons. The 
occurrence of an accident in a given year may tend to decrease the risk in the 
following year, because of increasing awareness of plant managers and 
regulators worldwide. On the other hand, an accident in a reactor may increase 
the risk of accident in another reactor of the same plant as was the case in 
Fukushima.
As a sensitivity test, the same calculation was done considering  what happened 
in Fukushima as three major accidents (INES level = 7). The results are 
presented on table 7.
7 Conclusion
Accidents at operational power plants have been considered for this study, an 
accident being defined as an event rated at INES level ≥ 4, and a major accident, 
as an INES level 7 event. Drawing samples of five random years from the past 
and assuming that they are all equi-probable, the probability of having a year with 
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a nuclear major accident in a five-year is 14.3%. The probability of having two 
major accident in a five-year time span is 1.0%. The probability of having at least 
one nuclear accident is 66.6% in a five-year sample (Table 5a). For a 30-year 
sample, we found that the probability of having at least one major accident was 
63.2%, and a 25.8% probability of having at least two (Table 5b). Our results are 
in agreement with previously published studies.
Improving safety in the nuclear industry requires transparency. Since the dataset 
completeness is a most important parameter in risk studies, we strongly support 
the establishment of a complete and public international historical report of 
incidents and accidents worldwide with the obligation for plant owners to report. 
We consider that the IAEA should be the most suited organization to host such a 
data set since this task would very well fit in its objectives recalled above.
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INES level NA 3 4 5 6 7 Total
All facility types, all years 22 17 22 4 1 2 68
Only power reactors, all years 16 14 9 2 0 2 43
Other facility types, all years 6 3 13 2 1 0 25
Only 1991-2011, all facility types 4 17 2 0 0 1 24
Table 3: Summary of the HJ 20120608 dataset of nuclear accidents. INES 
levels for pre-1991 events assessed by the author's.
DATE LOCATION COUNTRY FACILITY REACTOR TYPE DESCRIPTION INES
12/12/52 Chalk river Canada Test reactor NRX Core damage partial loss of coolant H2 explosion radioactivity release 5
29/11/55 Idaho Falls USA Test reactor EBR-1 fast neutron reactor partial (approx half) core melt - no exposure 4
29/09/57 Kyshtym Russia Waste storage Chemical explosion following tank cooling system failure 6
24/05/58 Chalk river Canada Test reactor NRU Fuel rupture and fire during unloading 4
25/10/58 Vinča Yugoslavia Test reactor Criticality excursion 6 personnel irradiation (1 fataly) 4
26/07/59 Santa Susana Field Lab. USA Test reactor SRE Power excursion + approx 1/3 fuel melt + radioactivity release 4
03/04/60 Waltz Mill USA Test reactor Core melt accident (1 fuel element) 4
03/01/61 Idaho Falls USA Test reactor SL-1 Main control rod manual removal + steam explosion – 3 fatalities 4
24/07/64 Rhode Island USA Fuel fabrication Criticality accident with Uranyl nitrate solution 4
05/10/66 Newport USA Power reactor Unit 1 Sodium fast breeder Two fuel assemblies out of 105 melted at Enrico Fermi Unit 1 4
01/05/67 Chapelcross UK Power reactor Unit 2 Magnox Fuel element melt and fire in part of core 4
01/05/67 Chelyabinsk Russia Fuel fabrication Radionuclides dispersal from dried out lake Karachay bed (Mayak PA dumpsite) 5
21/01/69 Lucens Switzerland Test reactor Coolant loss + power excursion and explosion. Radioactivity contained by cavern 4
17/10/69 Saint Laurent France Power reactor Unit A1 UNGG Partial (approx 50kg U) core melt during loading 4
26/05/71 Moscow Russia Test facility SF-3 Kurchatov Institute SF-3. Fuel rods fall out of support plate - criticality - 2 fatalities 4
26/09/73 Windscale UK Reprocessing Shop B 204 Gas leakage inside plant, Ruthenium 106 contamination, 35 workers injured 4
06/02/74 Leningrad Russia Power reactor Unit 1 RBMK-1000 Secondary circuit rupture - 3 fatalities 4
30/11/75 Leningrad Russia Power reactor Unit 1 RBMK-1000 Power excursion + partial core melt + atmospheric release 4
01/01/77 Beloyarsk USSR Power reactor ABM-200 early RBMK Unit 2 - half core melt 5
22/02/77 Jaslovske Bohunice Slovakia Power reactor KS 150 HWGCR A-1 unit refueling accident + primary and secondary circuits contamination 4
02/01/79 Three mile Island USA Power reactor TMI-2 PWR Reactor core melt 5
13/03/80 Saint Laurent France Power reactor Unit A2 UNGG Partial (approx 20kg U) core melt 4
09/09/82 Tchernobyl Ukraine Power reactor Unit 1 RBMK-1000 Partial core melt – fuel assembly channel 62-44 destroyed 4
23/09/83 Buenos Aires Argentina Test reactor RA-2 Operator died during a modification of the reactor core. 4
26/04/86 Tchernobyl Ukraine Power reactor Unit 4 RBMK-1000 Criticality accident + fire + steam explosion 7
24/11/89 Greifswlad Germany Power reactor Unit 5 VVER Near core melt - 10 fuel elements damaged 4
06/04/93 Tomsk Russia Reprocessing Explosive mechanical failure in a stainless steel reaction vessel 4
30/09/99 Tokimura Japan Fuel fabrication Criticality accident with U solution at conversion test building 4
12/04/11 Fukushima daichi Japan Power reactor Units 1 2 3 BWR Multiple core damage by loss of all cooling function 7
Table 4a: Subset list of civilian nuclear accidents with INES ≥ 4.
Date City Country Reactor INES Description
1966-10-05 Newport USA Unit 1 4 Two fuel assemblies out of 105 melted
1967-05-01 Chapelcross UK Unit 2 4 Fuel element melt and fire in part of core
1969-10-17 Saint Laurent France Unit 1 4 Partial (approx 50kg U) core melt during loading
1974-02-06 Leningrad Russia Unit 1 4 Secondary circuit rupture - 3 fatalities
1975-11-30 Leningrad Russia Unit 1 4
Power excursion + partial core melt + atmospheric 
release
1977-01-01 Beloyarsk USSR ABM-200 5 Unit 2 - half core melt
1977-02-22 Jaslovske Bohunice Slovakia A1 4
Refueling accident + corrosion + primary and 
secondary circuits contamination
1979-01-02 Three Mile Island USA Unit 2 5 Reactor core melt
1980-03-13 Saint Laurent France Unit 2 4 Partial (approx 20kg U) core melt
1982-09-09 Tchernobyl Ukraine Unit 1 4
Partial core melt – fuel assembly channel 62-44 
destroyed
1986-04-26 Tchernobyl Ukraine Unit 4 7 Criticality accident + fire + steam explosion
1989-11-24 Greifswald Germany Unit 5 4 Near core melt - 10 fuel elements damaged 
2011-04-12 Fukushima daichi Japan Units 1 2 3 7 Multiple core damage by loss of all cooling function
Table 4b: Subset list of the 13 accidents in civilian nuclear power reactors  
with an INES level ≥ 4
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Figure  1 (top)  : Chronology of accidents in this study's dataset of civilian  
nuclear accidents with INES level ≥ 4  for all facilities 
Figure 2  (bottom) : number of nuclear power reactors in operation, 1954-
2012 (Source: IAEA, Nuclear power reactors in the world, 2013 edition)
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Severity of events P(Ni = 0) P(Ni = 1) P(Ni = 2) P(Ni ≥ 3)
Accident (INES≥4) 33.4 % 37.5 % 20.3 % 8.7 %
Major Accident (INES=7) 84.6 % 14.3 % 1.0 % <0.1 %
Table 5a
Severity of events P(Ni = 0) P(Ni = 1) P(Ni = 2) P(Ni = 3) P(Ni = 4) P(Ni = 5) P(Ni = 6) P(Ni = 7) P(Ni = 8) P(Ni ≥ 9)
Accident (INES≥4) 0.1 % 0.9 % 3.2 % 7.0 % 11.5 % 15.1 % 16.3 % 15.0 % 11.9 % 19.0 %
P(Ni = 0) P(Ni = 1) P(Ni = 2) P(Ni = 3) P(Ni ≥4)
Major Accident 
(INES=7)
36.8 % 37.4 % 18.4 % 5.8 % 1.6 %
Table 5b
Table 5 : probabilities of nuclear accident or major accident worldwide in  
5-year (table 5a)  and 30-year (table 5b)
Severity of events P(Ni = 0) P(Ni = 1) P(Ni = 2) P(Ni ≥ 3)
Accident (INES≥4) 33.6 % 37.9 % 19.9 % 8.5 %
Major Accident (INES=7) 84.5 % 14.4 % 1.0 % <0.1 %
Table 6a
Severity of events P(Ni = 0) P(Ni = 1) P(Ni = 2) P(Ni = 3) P(Ni = 4) P(Ni = 5) P(Ni = 6) P(Ni = 7) P(Ni = 8) P(Ni ≥ 9)
Accident (INES≥4) 0.1 % 0.9 % 3.1 % 7.1 % 11.5 % 15.1 % 16.4 % 14.8 % 11.8 % 19.2 %
P(Ni = 0) P(Ni = 1) P(Ni = 2) P(Ni = 3) P(Ni ≥4)
Major Accident 
(INES=7)
37.0 % 37.2 % 18.5 % 5.7 % 1.6 %
Table 6b
Table 6 : probabilities of nuclear accident or major accident worldwide in  
5-year (table 6a) 30-year (table 6b) using the bootstrap method
Severity of events P(Ni = 0) P(Ni = 1) P(Ni = 2) P(Ni ≥ 3)
Accident (INES≥4) 33.4 % 34.1 % 17.3 % 15.0 %
Major Accident (INES=7) 84.6 % 7.2 % 0.2 % 8.0 %
Table 7a
Severity of events P(Ni = 0) P(Ni = 1) P(Ni = 2) P(Ni ≥ 3)
Accident (INES≥4) 33.3 % 34.3 % 17.5 % 15.1 %
Major Accident (INES=7) 84.7 % 7.1 % 0,2 % 7.9 %
Table 7b
Table 7 : probabilities of nuclear accident or major accident worldwide in  
5-year (table 7a) and using the bootstrap method (table 7b) counting the  
Fukushima event as 3 major accidents
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